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Agonism as a political theory emphasizes the ontological aspect of conflict in human political 
interaction. This article aims to shed light on the political practice of agonism – and in doing 
so on its limits – by viewing 'crisis discourse' as an agonistic political practice. As my 
analysis of the Dutch Socialist Party and the Freedom Party’s speech in the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis shows, crisis discourse aimed to (re)create a ‘people’ and to justify 
radical change in economic and social structures. Crisis discourse is employed to construct an 
'other' that can be based on ethnic and nationalist terms and to justify retroactive application 
of the law and the stripping of Dutch citizens of their rights. This attention to crisis discourse 
as an agonistic political practice highlights an unease within agonism itself: where must the 
agonist accepts limits to the conflict and contestation she so values? The article starts with 
Chantal Mouffe's answer to this question - her insistence that legitimate conflict must always 
recognize the shared values of equality and liberty - and proceeds to show that Mouffe's view 
unnecessarily relies on a deliberative democratic desire for consensus. Other than Mouffe, I 
draw on Honig’s emphasis of perpetual contestation to propose that the issue of limits can be 
best answered by reference to the core of agonistic thought: the preservation of the struggle 
over political norms and processes. It is not shared values or even a shared political space that 
matters, but that the political space of the ‘people’ – however contested membership therein 
might be – remains a place that the 'other' can re-enter. 
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1 Introduction 
At the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, Europe was in crisis. Greece was 
no longer able to service its debt, and began to request a series of loans from the IMF and 
European Union. Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus soon followed.  Concerns about weak 1
national economies with high sovereign debt collapsing and bringing the other Eurozone 
economies down with them were rampant, both in Europe and globally.  In 2010 national 2
elections were held in the Netherlands and, only two years later, after the government fell due 
to discord over austerity measures responding to the Eurozone crisis, another election was 
held. During both of these elections the concept of crisis loomed large. Political parties on the 
right and left mobilized a discourse of crisis that constructed specific threats to the political 
community and that worked to justify the necessity of certain deep changes to legal and 
political structures to remedy these threats, even going so far as to propose retroactive 
legislation and stripping certain Dutch citizens of their nationality. This article argues that the 
crisis discourse used by two specific political parties in the Netherlands, the Socialist Party 
and the Freedom Party, is both an example of agonism at work in political discourse and that 
this example can help us think through more carefully a key, yet underdeveloped, debate in 
agonistic theory: whether agonism accepts any limits to political contestation. When does the 
conflict agonists so value become unacceptable? 
Agonists approach politics from the starting-point that political systems depend on contingent 
foundations that produce and sustain relations of power that benefit some while excluding 
others.  Political struggle is seen as legitimately focusing on challenging those foundations, 3
thus including contest over the very principles, procedures and foundations of political life. In 
this sense, the democratic contest is seen as going  “all the way down”  to the fundamental 4
principles of a political system. Since agonists rejects the possibility of ever eliminating 
contingency or the influence of power relations on political decision-making,  agonistic 5
politics is about the struggle over which particular “configuration of power relations around 
which a given society is structured” gains hegemonic status.    6
Over the past decade-and-a-half, multiple theories of agonism have appeared, been fleshed 
out and analyzed. Many scholars have attended to the different streams of agonsim,  the ethos 7
needed for agonism to thrive,  and most recently, what agonism means for the institutional 8
structure of democratic political systems.  Yet, during this period, the issue of the limits to 9
acceptable political activity within an agonistic conception has remained unsatisfactorily 
conceptualized. Theories of agonism promote and value conflict and contestation and argue 
that legitimate political debate can include dissent over the fundamental values of society. 
They hold that change of the most basic institutions must be possible and claim that any 
given society cannot avoid exclusion and othering. It remains, however, unclear whether 
agonist theory posits any limits to this contest? Can any values and any type of change be 
legitimately argued for? Are all exclusions to be accepted? 
The answers that some agonists have attempted to give to these questions remain 
unsatisfactory. Chantal Mouffe gives us the most guidance on these questions, arguing that in 
order for political action to be acceptable, it must take place within a shared symbolic space 
of equality and liberty. According to Mouffe, once a political actor leaves this symbolic space 
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and no longer accepts the values of equality and liberty, her actions can no longer be 
considered acceptable from the perspective of agonism and she becomes an enemy.  This 10
approach however seems to reveal an underlying reliance on more consensus-oriented 
deliberative democracy – the very strand of thought that agonism aims to critique. After all, if 
the point agonist scholars are making is that the political is about the contestation of the very 
foundations of a particular society – how can values such as equality and liberty be placed 
beyond this space of contestation? Moreover, Mouffe’s insistence on shared political values 
fails to accurately identify the real risk of agonistic conflict: not that values are contested, but 
that conflict leads to the permanent destruction of the other. While Mouffe’s work does 
recognize the need for agonism to prevent such permanent destruction, the importance claim 
is weakened by Mouffe’s attention to other more substantive limits to political conflict.  
I argue that a more satisfactory approach to the limits of conflict can be found by attending to 
how agonism plays out, concretely, in the language political actors use. Attention to political 
discourse clarifies how agonism works in the everyday business of politics and, by doing so, 
reveals the concrete implications of an agonistic attitude towards politics, including the risks 
conflict can entail. This attention to the discourse of agonism as used in actual political 
practice remedies the shortcomings of agonism’s traditional approaches to the limits of 
acceptable politics in two ways. First, by attending to the actual practice of the political and 
by seeing language as a site of agonism, we are able to more clearly grasp the risks inherent 
in agonism and more clearly specify what can be done about these risks. As we move from 
the abstract level of agonistic theory to the very concrete level of agonistic practice, it 
becomes apparent what exactly is at stake in agonistic contests. In other words, by taking 
language seriously, we are able to take the risks of agonism more seriously. Second, in 
attending to discourse as a tool of agonism, we stay true to agonism’s post-foundational 
commitment to the importance – and contingency – of meaning in the political. It is this 
contingency of meaning that eventually leads us to a more sufficient conceptualization of the 
limits of acceptable political activity, thus avoiding Mouffe’s proposal that these limits can 
only be found in consensus-based liberal democratic ideas of a shared commitment to 
equality and liberty.  
The particular type of language use this article focuses on is what I call crisis discourse: a 
narrative that discursively constructs a threat and that frames a fundamental change to the 
legal, social or political order as the only way to address that threat. In doing so, crisis 
discourse has the potential to (re-)constitute the friend/enemy distinction in a political 
community around the constructed threat and act as a catalyst of structural change.  These 11
two characteristics of crisis discourse – its ability to call into being a ‘people’ and call for 
radical change make crisis discourse a tool of agonistic politics. In this sense, when one 
‘speaks crisis’, something is done. Crisis discourse is often approached as a ‘speech act’: it 
does more than simply reflect reality as it already is. Speaking crisis can be seen as a 
‘performative utterance’  that – when successful – brings a reality into existence that was not 12
there before.  In this way, my approach to crisis discourse can be reconciled with agonism’s 13
post-foundationalism. Within post-foundationalist theories, language and language games are 
acknowledged as the means by which humans attribute meaning to the world and by which 
humans are turned into subjects. It is through discourse that power is exercised and through 
discourse that power is challenged.  This discursive aspect of politics – and of the 14
!3
construction of crises – drives my focus on the specific language used by those invoking 
crisis discourse. By examining this site of power in a systematic way, as the following 
sections will do, we can see more concretely how exclusion takes place in political activity, 
what its effects are in a particular case and take the risks of this exclusion seriously. Attention 
for the illocutionary force of crisis discourse will show that we can view the risks of agonistic 
speech as part of a continuum of risk: while risk cannot be eliminated from political speech, 
we can evaluate whether political speech brings us closer to or farther away from the limit 
between the conflict agonism values and that which it cannot.  
In what follows, I will define crisis discourse in more detail and show how it is used in 
political communication (Section 2). I apply my analysis to the crisis discourse employed in 
relation to the financial upheaval that has marked the second decade of the 21st century, 
focusing on the discourse used by two Dutch political parties in relation to what is often 
termed the ‘European sovereign debt crisis’ . Section 2 further explores how crisis discourse 15
functions as a tool of agonistic politics as I emphasize crisis discourse’s ability to 
(re)constitute a ‘people’ and to call for fundamental change. The concrete examples of crisis 
discourse in Section 2 set the stage for the subsequent exploration of where agonism sets the 
limits to acceptable political speech in Section 3. Here, I acknowledge the risks attendant in 
using crisis discourse, risks that agonists seem too often to underestimate and I explore where 
the limits of using crisis discourse as a political tool lie, by taking language – and the risks – 
seriously. At the same time, I ensure that I maintain the possibility of perpetual contestation 
contest over political values and institutions, an emphasis particularly present in Honig’s 
work on agonism.  In the end, I propose viewing the dangers of agonistic speech as part of a 16
continuum of risky illocutions with a clear boundary between the agonistic behavior that can 
be positioned on this continuum and unacceptable behavior that crosses the boundary into 
antagonism: the realm of the destruction of the other. 
2 Crisis Discourse as a Tool of Agonistic Politics 
Crisis discourse has been impossible to ignore during recent years’ developments in financial 
markets. During the financial crisis that started after the fall of a number of systemic banks in 
2007 and 2008, political and economic actors employed crisis discourse that framed these 
events and attributed causes and responsibilities to certain actors and objects.  Different 17
variations of crisis discourse were pervasive in the public speech of international corporations 
and national political organizations.  As a term, crisis discourse can be traced to different 18
lineages. The field of crisis communication within a larger literature on business 
communication has enjoyed increasing popularity over the past 15 years.  This field has 19
focused mostly on how companies can best react to crises in order to protect their reputation 
and to manage shareholder impressions,  although recent attention has also been paid to the 20
potential crisis offers for the introduction of innovations in business.  The study of crisis 21
itself has also been a point of interest within the field of international relations and public 
policy studies.  
With his seminal article in 1999,  Colin Hay provided a framework for understanding when 22
and how crises can arise, and what affects they have on the state. Although not focusing 
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specifically on the role of discourse, Hay’s work provided the basics necessary for later 
exploration of how crisis discourse can be constructed by political actors.  Most recently, 23
crisis discourse has been explored within critical discourse studies.   In this section I will 24
analyze the crisis discourse with the following method of discourse analysis. 
Discourse analysis starts from the assumption that language does something. Language calls 
into being a new reality based on its performative force. When we speak we not only describe 
‘reality’ but at the same time create or transform reality. This constitutive function of 
language is referred to as language’s illocutionary force.  In order to study this function of 25
language, discourse analysis studies how language contained in a variety of texts links 
together various elements into a chain of meaning. It is important to recognize that it is 
impossible to ever fully localize a complete discourse and instead, one must look to texts as 
artifacts that can give us indications of the content of social discourse. In this way, the text – 
as a written or spoken selection of language – serves as a crystalized point of discourse, 
evidence (and to some extent a simplification) of the complex and dynamic language games 
that produce social reality.  26
My concern with crisis discourse as a tool of agonistic politics, leads me to focus my analysis 
on public discourse in this article. To illustrate the main characteristics of crisis discourse, 
this section draws on instances of crisis discourse used by two Dutch political parties during 
the so-called ‘European sovereign debt crisis’. These two political parties, the Socialist Party 
(Socialist Partij) and the Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid) are situated at opposite ends 
of the Dutch political spectrum. The Socialist Party is the most left-leaning party in Dutch 
parliament, and the Freedom Party the most right-leaning party in Dutch parliament.  Based 27
on the realization that crisis discourse can be a tool for structural change, it is a logical 
assumption that the parties furthest from the political status-quo would be most likely to 
employ crisis discourse (although this is certainly not to say centrist parties never attempt to 
change the status quo through crisis discourse). While this article focuses on crisis discourse 
as used in the Netherlands, the speech used by the left-populist Socialist Party and the right-
populist Freedom Party echoes that employed by other anti-establishment parties and 
candidates, on both the left and the right in other Western democracies, for example in France 
(with La France insoumise on the left and the Front National on the right) or the United 
States (with Democratic primary candidate Bernie Sanders on the left and Donald Trump on 
the right). As will be shown below, a survey of the Socialist Party and Freedom Party’s 
discourse between 2010-2014 provides us with an example of the use of crisis discourse 
during the critical years of the European sovereign debt crisis.  
The key characteristic of crisis discourse is its ability to discursively frame events in ways 
that define a particular problem and postulate a seemingly necessary solution, thus 
“selectively legitimating certain courses of action.”  Constructing a moment as crisis 28
requires “a double articulation of the events themselves and of a solution to the morbid, 
underlying condition they were claimed to represent.”  In crisis discourse, the first of these 29
articulations diagnoses, naming a problem or threat, the latter proposes a specific change 
necessary to solve of this problem.  
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Framing the threat of crisis 
In its framing of the problem, crisis discourse creates an urgent threat that is posed by a 
‘them’ to an ‘us’.   The problem is attributed to a group that is constructed as being opposed 30
to the ‘us’, the group who is unduly threatened by the problem. If the crisis is to be taken 
seriously, and if the solution is to be justified, the threat must be construed as an existential 
threat: a threat to the physical survival of an individual or group or a threat to the survival of 
the individual or group’s identity. 
Crisis discourse’s framing of the problem as a threat to a current way of life can be seen in 
the language used by both the Socialist Party and the Freedom Party regarding how they 
perceived the threat posed by the Eurozone crisis, although it is clear that the parties differ in 
their definition of this threat. The Socialist Party’s use of crisis discourse focused specifically 
on the economic causes and effects of recession and budget cuts, and placed the blame 
squarely on the financial sector and the politicians who facilitate it.  
The Netherlands is at a crossroads. Our economy is in a recession that threatens to deepen into a great 
crisis. A crisis with lost jobs, lower wages and threats to our pensions. A crisis with great social 
consequences. One that undermines solidarity, shared destinies and confidence in the future. This is not 
a natural disaster that just happened to us. It is the consequence of a derailed financial sector. A 
consequence of a system that favors the short term interests of shareholders and consumers above the 
long term interests of citizens, employees and our society as a whole.    31
Serving the bill of the crisis to those who had no part in the cause of the crisis, causes more crisis. Not 
less. [This is] an approach that ensures that thousands of people are sitting at home unemployed and 
that smothers the recovery of the economy. That is a costly lesson history has taught us before. A lesson 
this cabinet has forgotten.  32
In constructing this threat, the crisis discourse used by the Socialist Party presupposed an 
‘us’, a ‘people’ who is being threatened by a ‘them’, the ‘most rich’, bankers and speculators 
as well as the political parties whose policies allowed for these enemies to have their way: 
In the past years, European leaders have paid more attention to the financial markets than to the needs 
of the citizens. The Dutch government is participating in that.   33
The government … lets the most-rich do whatever they want. And imposes cuts of billions on citizens. 
… Such austerity politics enlarges the division in society and suffocates economic growth.    34
In contrast to the Socialist Party’s framing of the threat as mainly economic, caused by the 
financial sector, the Freedom Party constructed a far broader threat. Although the threat of 
economic crisis was discussed explicitly, often the Freedom Party expanded the crisis to 
include a threat posed by ‘Europe’ and immigrants to the Netherlands. So for example, the 
Freedom Party discursively linked a threat to the welfare state in the context of the European 
sovereign debt crisis with immigration from Muslim countries: 
Only the Freedom Party is standing up to protect the welfare state and is therefore in favor of stopping 
immigration from Islamic countries. You can’t have both: either you are a welfare state or an 
immigration country. All other parties choose the latter.    35
The Freedom Party claimed that the Dutch state was in a crisis that was the biggest since the 
introduction of liberal democracy into the Dutch constitution by Thorbecke and linked this, 
again, to a threat posed by immigration:  
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Our democracy is in the biggest crisis since Thorbecke. More and more Dutch people are wondering 
why The Hague is pushing on with these disastrous measures that are not supported by our people. In 
the meantime, many have the feeling that we are losing the Netherlands. Neighborhood after 
neighborhood, school after school is being islamified.    36
Part of the threat perceived by the Freedom Party during the European sovereign debt crisis 
was the power the Freedom Party saw the European Union as having over the Netherlands.  
Brussels, keep your hands off our taxes. Never, ever European taxes! We citizens are not here to 
finance your undemocratic organizations. Look up how the Eighty Year War started (Hint: it started 
with the tiende penning, a tax of the European superstate of those days).   37
And why does the Netherlands give seven billion euro to Brussels each year, while our elderly have 
pajama days and have to pay for their own walker? Did they rebuild the Netherlands after the war or 
did those Greek swindlers?   38
Brussels wants to control the Netherlands to the last detail … Bye, bye freedom.  39
In the Freedom Party’s crisis discourse, just like in the Socialist Party’s, a clear ‘us’ is created 
and juxtaposed against a ‘them’ that is causing the threat. However, the Freedom Party’s ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ are differently composed than the Socialist Party’s. For the Freedom Party, the 
group being threatened by the crisis was ethnically and nationalistically defined – the Dutch, 
non-Muslim citizen was the ‘us’, set against the ‘them’ of the European Union and of Islam.  
Framing the call to change 
The framing of the urgent and existential threat posed by the crisis is linked to the solution 
the crisis discourse calls for. How this solution is framed is the second unique aspect of crisis 
discourse. “Defining the solution is fundamental to the construction of crisis.”  There are 40
two types of solutions that can be proposed to the ‘problem’ or ‘threat’ defined in the 
diagnostic crisis frame: the first is when “a solution is sought within the pre-existing and 
largely unmodified structures of the state regime, generally in the absence of a crisis 
narrative.”   This is to say, when this response is employed, the particular register of ‘crisis’ 41
is downplayed. Instead, it is argued that the events are not rightly interpreted as crises, but 
rather as incidental failures that can be dealt with by using the current measures in place. The 
second type of solution that can be offered is one in which “the very institutional form of the 
system of reference … is fundamentally transformed.” A restructuring of the system is 
proposed as the necessary solution.  It is only when this solution is offered, in addition to the 42
diagnostic frame of a threat that I speak of crisis discourse. Crisis discourse is characterized 
by a call to take action that breaks with past approaches; action that entails structural change. 
As Hay argues, “during moments of crisis, indeed, during the very process of crisis 
identification, the state is discursively reconstituted as an object in need of decisive 
intervention and as the object of strategic restructuring.”    43
The Socialist Party called very explicitly for structural change in response to the crisis and 
proposed a shift away from austerity and towards active investment and solidarity. The 
Socialist Party appealed to the people to take an active part in this moment in history and to 
decide what type of society they want to live in, thus doing the work of positing the state as in 
need of the ‘decisive intervention’ Hay speaks of. 
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The way out of this crisis will also not just be something that happens to us, that presents itself 
naturally … This is not the time to sit on your hands. It is time to roll up your sleeves. To make the 
right choices for the future. So that the derailed financial system gets back on track and the long-term 
interests of the Netherlands prevail over the short-term profit hunting or short-sighted austerity. A 
recession must be fought with cuts based on solidarity, smart investments and reforms. Not just with 
cold austerity such as the cabinet is doing.   44
These elections will determine whether our society becomes even harder and the division even bigger, 
or that we now make another choice and start building a more social, more humane and more 
sustainable Netherlands.    45
Future generations will look at us critically. And ask why this crisis wasn’t used to make the transition 
to a more sustainable future. Clean energy, dealing with pollution and protecting the environment. They 
will ask themselves why only a few years after the crisis in the financial sector it is back to business as 
usual and a new crisis has not been prevented. Future generations will wonder why the causes of the 
crisis have not been dealt with.   46
The Freedom Party also proposed certain solutions to the threats their crisis discourse 
constructs. Their solutions were less concrete, but no less clear. In the words of the Freedom 
Party, on the issue of the threat posed by the EU and Islam in the context of economic crisis: 
Our battle is a just one and we are standing on the shoulders of those who went before us. And we must 
do the same as our ancestors: Parliament must issue a serious warning to the most powerful institute of 
Europe, in this case the multicultural superstate with its capital in Brussels – the empire that wants to 
impose more Islam on us and take away every memory of an independent and recognizable 
Netherlands. Again: a people that is led by the wrong leaders has to be able to say goodbye to the ruling 
ideology.   47
We are the only ones who are saying to the unelected eurocrats: your end is our beginning. Your dream 
is our nightmare. Your loss is our gain. We are the only ones saying: it has to end somewhere. Now it is 
time to be the boss in our own country. Our flag is red-white-blue.   48
This call for change, if accepted by sufficiently powerful and numerous groups, can indeed 
lead to structural change. In this way, the use of crisis discourse implies a “moment in which 
the unity of the state is discursively renegotiated and, potentially, reachieved and in which a 
new strategic trajectory is imposed upon the institutions that now (re-)comprise it.”   49
Above we have seen the characteristics of crisis discourse, particularly focusing on the 
discourse used in relation to the European sovereign debt crisis. The next two parts of this 
section focus on how crisis discourse acts as a tool of agonism. By attending to the ability of 
crisis discourse to create us/them distinctions and call for and justify change, these next parts 
explore how crisis discourse reflects the agonistic characteristics in political interaction.  
(Re)Constituting ‘the people’ 
Despite great variety within theories of agonism,  agonists share the assumption that politics 50
is not a matter of rational deliberation between equally powerful parties, but rather that they 
key characteristic of the political is the distinction between a ‘we’ and a ‘they’, an inside and 
an outside to the political community. How this distinction is given shape is not fixed or 
natural, but is rather the object of political activity and contestation. In this contest between 
defining and shifting the boundaries of insiders and outsiders, a conception of the ‘people’ – 
and what this ‘people’ want – is at stake and this struggle is the “political act par 
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excellence”  This emphasis on in- and exclusion in political activity is grounded on the 51
ontological assumption that difference is “an axiological principle of our collective lives.”  52
Agonists see it as ontologically impossible for any one regime or ideology to encompass and 
represent all the interests and identities of all people.  Every consensus, every constellation 53
of political power, is “based on acts of exclusion” and reveals “the impossibility of a fully 
inclusive ‘rational’ consensus.”    54
Crisis discourse engages in this political act ‘par excellence’ of creating a people, by 
discursively creating an us/them division. Crisis discourse’s construction of a threat, 
discursively creates an ‘other’ who is framed as the cause of the threat and must be excluded 
from the ‘people’ – an inside – who is threatened and must be protected. By naming a threat 
broad enough to threaten more than one particular group, crisis discourse is able to bring 
various groups together into a coalition that sees itself sharing an overarching interest in 
dealing with this threat. It articulates a discourse that emphasizes common interests instead of 
differences between the groups that are formed into a ‘people’.  This discourse masks and 55
depoliticizes differences between the different groups and individuals that comprise the ‘us’ 
while it (re)politicizes differences between the ‘us’ and the ‘them’. 
This construction of the people goes beyond only reflecting or reinforcing a construction of a 
people that is already present in political discourse. As we see in the Freedom Party and 
Socialist Party’s use of crisis discourse, crisis discourse can also reconstitute the distinctions 
between the ‘us’ and the ‘them’, disrupting previously constituted coalitions. By articulating 
new logics of equivalence, crisis discourse peels away particular groups from former 
coalitions. Here, groups are destabilized as crisis discourse (re)politicizes the differences 
within the group. For example, the Socialist Party’s use of crisis discourse attempts to 
(re)constitute the ‘people’ around class lines, positioning “shareholders and consumers” 
against “citizens, employees and our society as a whole.”  The Socialist Party referred to the 56
interest the ‘people’ have in not enduring the deep austerity cuts and argues that these cuts 
should instead be borne by the ‘most rich’ so as to discursively link the many diverse groups 
outside the ‘most rich’ together in a ‘people’. All who are not the ‘most rich’ are discursively 
linked together in a common project.  The Socialist Party called this people into being, while 57
it acted on its behalf. The Freedom Party also called a ‘people’ into being, and did so by 
referring to the threat ‘Islamification’ posed to traditional Dutch identity (to be found in the 
welfare state, neighborhoods and schools) and by placing Dutch financial interests against 
those of the larger European Union. The people the Freedom Party created is one that is 
nationalistically, but also ethnically, defined. Only those within the borders of the 
Netherlands – and only those who did not get there as the result of immigration from Muslim 
countries – are counted as belonging to the people. Again, here too, the Freedom Party linked 
together the many diverse groups that can be found within the ethnically Dutch in opposition 
to the ‘threat’ posed by Islamification,  the ‘European superstate’  and ‘Greek swindlers.’    58 59 60
Changing the rules of the democratic game 
Agonists emphasize that political conflict between groups includes conflict over basic ideas 
about what is “reasonable or unreasonable, legitimate or illegitimate political action and 
speech.”  From this perspective, agonists argue that the possibility to contest the very 61
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procedures and agreements of democracy is vital; these procedures and agreements must 
always be open to change. Politics “is the type of game in which the framework – the rules of 
the game – can come up for deliberation and amendment in the course of the game.”  And 62
this room for conflict and contestation must be preserved and, as Chantal Mouffe explains: 
“… the specificity of modern democracy lies in the recognition and the legitimation 
of conflict and the refusal to suppress it though the imposition of an authoritarian 
order. A well-functioning democracy calls for a confrontation between democratic 
political positions, and this requires a real debate about possible alternatives.”  63
Here, again, we see crisis discourse having a role to play. As we saw in the Freedom Party 
and Socialist Party’s use of crisis discourse, this particular discourse allows the speaker to 
call for change to the structure of the current system. The Socialist Party called for major, 
structural change to the economic system and argued that the cause of the crisis can only be 
solved if the foundational principles of the capitalist economy are overhauled.  The Freedom 64
Party’s solution to the threat posed by Islamification and ‘Europe’ is found in defending the 
Netherlands against this influence. It implies rejecting the ‘ruling ideology’, the 
multiculturalism that the Netherlands – and Europe – has built its democracy on since World 
War II, and means far-reaching change to the Dutch state’s current legal and political links to 
the European Union, as well as to guarantees and protections of rights of immigrants.  
In practice, this rhetoric crystalized into the Socialist Party supporting a thorough reform of 
the financial sector, setting caps on incomes for managers in the public and semipublic sector, 
limiting the power of shareholders and criminalizing financial mismanagement. The Socialist 
Party proposed a new top tax rate of 65% and a new way of taxing wealth so as to combat 
unequal distribution of wealth in the Netherlands.  The Socialist Party was in favor of 65
“clipping the wings” of private equity funds that take over companies and “suck them dry as 
locusts do.”  The Socialist Party has moreover argued in favor of the retroactive application 66
of legislation banning bonuses for managers at financial institutions that received state 
support after the crisis.  In practice, this meant arguing in favor of 100% taxation rate on any 67
bonuses given to such managers, even if the bonuses were given before the proposed law 
passed. The Freedom Party used the ‘crisis’ to justify its calls for banning immigration from 
“Islamic countries.”  Moreover, the Freedom Party proposed stripping convicted criminals 68
who have double nationalities of their Dutch citizenship, deporting non-Dutch citizens who 
commit a crime  and criminalizing being in the Netherlands without a valid permit.  The 69 70
Freedom Party argued in favor of stripping non-Dutch citizens of their voting rights in local 
elections and stripping Dutch citizens with a second nationality of the ability to be a member 
of the government, parliament and local political organs.   71
These calls for change are buttressed by reference to the supposed existential threat the crisis 
discourse is based on. The claim is that the threat occurred because the current structures 
failed to prevent it and this threat now must be dealt with by changing the structure that 
allowed this threat to materialize. These calls for change concern the very rules of the 
‘democratic game’; including changes to fundamental political and legal procedures (for 
example stripping people of voting rights and retroactive application of the law) and 
fundamental rights (stripping people of citizenship). In this way, the crisis discourse fits 
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within an agonistic view on what political conflict is about: conflict over the very ideas upon 
which a current political system is based. Moreover, as shown above, crisis discourse can 
create extremely exclusive conceptions of the people, conceptions based on race, religion and 
class. These concrete examples of exclusion and calls for change raise concerns about 
whether agonism can see all calls for change as legitimate political action? Do proposed 
changes ever go too far for agonists or does the importance of contestation and conflict mean 
that no type of change can be off limits?  
The ability of crisis discourse to create, solidify and break the us/them distinction and the 
ability of crisis discourse to justify structural change reveals its deeply political potentials. 
The use of crisis discourse in this way, to participate in the struggle over meaning, gives us an 
example of agonism at work in current politics. Yet, this analysis also made concrete just how 
far the othering and calls for change can go within crisis discourse. This section showed how 
the Socialist Party and the Freedom Party used crisis discourse to discursively exclude the 
other and to justify fundamental political and legal change, including the retroactive 
application of laws, labeling all the inhabitants of a particular countries determined “Islamic” 
unwelcome in the Netherlands and stripping certain Dutch citizens of their nationality. The 
following section explores the question whether agonists must accept all such exclusions and 
calls for change or whether agonists must admit limits to the conflict and contestation they so 
value. I will start by exploring the answer Mouffe gives to this question, and proceed to argue 
that this answer is insufficient as it relies too much on the very consensus-oriented politics 
agonism aims to critique and fails to take seriously the risks posed by crisis discourse. 
Instead, I propose a theory of the limits of legitimate political activity that draws on tenets 
inherent in the values agonism itself professes. I develop the idea of a ‘continuum of risky 
illocutions’ that helps us better conceptualize agonism’s boundaries of the acceptable. 
3 Speaking Crisis 
Crisis discourse can be a powerful tool for shifting the boundaries of the ‘people’ and for 
calling for foundational change. But it also has the potential to activate a type of conflict in 
which no limits are placed on the destruction of the other.  Moreover, crisis discourse can 72
construct an argument for change that impacts the very foundations of political, social or 
legal orders. This type of change often entails an increased willingness to deviate from 
political and legal procedures, as well as from the protection of fundamental rights. This 
willingness is supported by the logic of necessity crisis discourse invokes: the link 
discursively made between the threat and the seemingly necessary solution. As we have seen 
in the examples of crisis discourse discussed above, this type of speech can pit the ‘average’ 
person against the most rich,  compare private equity funds to locusts,  evoke imageries of 73 74
past wars,  and claim that Dutch citizens are being robbed of their freedom,  as the EU 75 76
“impose[s] more Islam on us.”  The past section showed how this discourse can intensify the 77
exclusion of an ‘other’ and justify departures from the rule of law and human rights violations 
against this other. Yet, from the perspective agonists take on politics, attempts to change the 
political system are not exceptional or extraordinary but rather part and parcel of the political. 
Moreover, conflict between groups is seen as an inevitable part of the struggle that 
characterizes the political, and is an aspect that must not be suppressed. However, agonists 
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also acknowledge the possibility that the us/them distinction can become too hardened, at 
which point the contest can no longer be characterized as agonistic, but rather as antagonistic. 
At that point, contestation is no longer productive but becomes destructive, and should be 
considered unacceptable.  
This section will explore how the line between agonistic and antagonistic conflict should be 
drawn. It starts with Chantal Mouffe’s conception of this boundary and her insistence on the 
necessity of such limits between acceptable agonistic political behavior and unacceptable 
antagonistic relations.  The first part of this section will critically reflect on the utility of 78
Mouffe’s suggestion that the realm of antagonistic relations is entered once participants of a 
political conflict reject a shared symbolic space characterized by acceptance of the values of 
equality and liberty and argues that Mouffe’s approach fails to take sufficiently seriously the 
risks of agonistic speech. I will show that Mouffe’s proposal is internally inconsistent and, in 
its current form, not able to perform the important function of distinguishing between 
agonistic and antagonistic forms of political action. 
In the second part of this section, I propose an account of the limits of agonism that uses 
Honig’s insistence that every consensus produces remainders to radicalize Mouffe’s view of a 
shared symbolic space. I argue in favor of conceptualizing this space differently from 
Mouffe. Instead of seeing this space as being characterized by shared values that may not be 
departed from, it is belonging within this space that is seen as the very object of contestation. 
Who is inside and who is outside this space of the political community is what is at stake in 
agonistic politics and, as such, in order for politics to remain agonistic, this conflict must 
always remain possible. In other words, agonistic politics requires two things: first, the 
boundary between the inside and the outside of this shared space is drawn and, second, that 
this boundary always only be drawn as a temporary and thus permeable boundary.  Unlike 
Mouffe, I show that where the boundary is drawn between the inside and the outside cannot 
be evaluated based on the insistence of shared liberal democratic values, but rather only 
based on whether the second criteria – the temporary and permeable nature of the boundary – 
is respected. I proceed to analyze the crisis discourse used by the Socialist Party and the 
Freedom Party with this distinction between agonism and antagonism. To do so, I develop the 
notion of a continuum of risky illocution in order to position these uses of crisis discourse 
based on whether they move towards or away from antagonistic relations. This has the 
function of emphasizing that even agonistic speech, speech that does not directly call for the 
eradication of the other, carries with it the risk of antagonism. 
Finding the frontier between agonism and antagonism 
In this section, I examine Mouffe’s approach to the risks attendant in agonism and attempt to 
remedy her reliance on a shared liberal-democratic political space, a reliance that fails to take 
seriously the necessity of deep conflict over political values and the risks inherent therein.  I 79
argue that there can be limits to the acceptable use of crisis discourse that are based on 
agonistic values themselves. In doing so, my aim is not to reject Mouffe’s view of agonism 
but rather to show how her own agonistic convictions can sustain a theory of responsible use 
of crisis discourse, without either relying on consensual liberal democratic ideals of a 
common core of shared substantive values or accepting any and all type of struggle. 
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Mouffe is clear that adhering to agonism does not imply accepting all demands as 
legitimate.  She distinguishes between those demands which can be accepted as a legitimate 80
part of the agonistic debate and those which should be excluded, not because they are morally 
unacceptable but because “they challenge the institutions constitutive of the democratic 
political association.”  While Mouffe also acknowledges that contestation of the nature of 81
these institutions is, at the same time, the very thing that agonism sees as core to political 
debate, she argues that this contestation can only take place if the actors engaged in such 
contestation share a symbolic space, characterized by the ethico-political values of liberty and 
equality.  In her view, the conflict and contestation valued in agonism is a conflict and 82
contestation that must occur within the bounds of agreement on these values, even while the 
meaning of these values is disputed. In her words, “a line should … be drawn between those 
who reject those values outright and those who, while accepting them, fight for conflicting 
interpretations.”  Accordingly, once the political debate moves outside of this shared 83
symbolic space, adversaries turn into enemies and agonism into antagonism. Those who 
reject these values “cannot form part of the agonistic space” and thus can only be dealt with 
as the ‘enemy’ relevant for antagonistic relations.  At this moment, politics is no longer 84
possible and instead human interaction is characterized by violence and domination.  
Mouffe thus attempts to draw a clear line between agonistic politics and antagonism by 
pointing to the importance of accepting the values of equality and liberty. According to 
Mouffe, agonism is characterized by conflicts over the meaning of these values, while 
antagonism occurs when these values are themselves rejected.  There are two problems with 85
this approach. Firstly, it brings Mouffe very close to the consensual deliberative democracy 
she critiques and, secondly, it fails to acknowledge that the very questions of who have 
liberty and how much and who are equal are at the core of the political. I will explain each 
critique in turn. 
Mouffe’s emphasis on the need for a shared symbolic space characterized by the acceptance 
of the values of equality and liberty seems to contradict the importance she places on deep 
conflict, conflict that supposedly includes the foundational values of a political community. 
Mouffe’s need for a shared consensus characterized by particular values whose acceptance 
(but not meaning) are beyond the pale of political contestation within which citizens can 
engage in agonistic politics mirrors the consensus-focused forms of democracy she aims to 
critique.  Mouffe’s solution is particularly problematic because it implies that political 86
opponents who explicitly reject and attempt to bring change to the shared symbolic space are 
risking devolution into antagonism. Yet, this very change is what agonism says politics is 
about. If Mouffe’s perspective on agonism requires the rejection of political projects that call 
for changes to accepted political ideals and institutions, little room is left for any attempts to 
change the ‘rules to the game’, attempts that agonists profess to accept – and promote – as 
part of a healthy political encounter. Mouffe’s conception of the limits of the acceptable 
appears preclude that very political struggle from taking place, resulting in the end in a 
“politics of minor stakes”  in which contestation is only accepted if it does not strike too 87
deeply at the heart of the existing hegemonic constellation.  
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Mouffe explicitly acknowledges that her approach to the frontiers of the acceptable are 
informed by the liberal democratic principles that are constitutive of “our form of life”.  88
Mouffe’s frontier is in essence not one between agonism and antagonism, but between the 
liberal democratic principles that currently inspire the ethico-political nature of contemporary 
western political institutions on the one hand and threats to liberal democracy on the other. 
From this perspective, we can say that Mouffe is attempting to broaden the register of 
acceptable political discussion within political liberalism, arguing contra many deliberative 
democrats that the definition of reasonable pluralism cannot be determined based on 
rationality or morality, but is rather always an object of political contestation.  In the end, 89
Mouffe’s approach is far less a determination of the difference between legitimate and 
illegitimate political demands and action in general and far more a determination between 
legitimate and illegitimate liberal democratic political demands and action. By taking the 
values of liberty and equality as an unassailable starting point she positions the ‘acceptable’ 
only within the realm of liberal democratic political possibilities. This approach may 
certainly be a valuable addition to liberal democracy, but fails to provide much guidance on 
where the line can be drawn between agonistic politics in general (without any particular 
allegiance to liberal democracy) and the antagonism agonists try to keep at bay. 
Moreover, I argue that Mouffe’s distinction reveals a failure to account for the fact that 
debates over the very appropriateness of liberty and equality in particular circumstances are 
at the core of the political choices we make. This failure makes her distinction both under- 
and over-inclusive, and thus lacking in utility. Let me explain this claim: On the one hand, 
this distinction lacks the ability to recognize the threat to agonism posed by political actors 
who pay lip service to the values of liberty and equality, all the while using these professed 
values to justify the destruction of the other. Surely a person calling for the death of all 
monarchs based on the reasoning that all people are equal and the very existence of monarchy 
threatens that equality would not still fall within the acceptable limits of agonism, despite the 
fact that the person advocated for such a measure on the basis of equality. In this way, 
Mouffe’s focus on adhering to the values of liberty and equality fails to accurately classify 
those who engage in antagonistic behavior as antagonistic, thus being an under-inclusive test. 
On the other hand, this distinction is over-inclusive, because if lip service is not enough to 
prove one’s adherence to these values, then the whole matter becomes a question of which 
engagements fit within the acceptable range of a debate over the meaning of these values and 
which fall outside the acceptable range.  And if this is actually the question, and not whether 90
one uses the terms equality and liberty with which to frame one’s demands, then it does not 
automatically matter whether one rejects the use of these terms. It is possible that political 
speech rejects equality or liberty on some register, while not necessarily being antagonistic. 
One can, for example, very well argue that inequality is appropriate in a certain circumstance 
and still be found adhering to the broader value of equality overall. For example, one can 
argue that someone who is convicted of murder should be deprived of liberty and lose some 
equality viz-a-viz someone who has not been convicted of murder, and still conceivably not 
be considered as ushering in antagonistic relations from Mouffe’s perspective. Moreover, the 
whole agonistic political endeavor of constituting a people, a ‘we’ over and against a ‘them’, 
implies some inequality on some register. Thus to say that agonistic political behavior must 
accept these values of liberty and equality seems to strip agonism of much of the analytical 
value that Mouffe believes it has. 
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These two flaws in Mouffe’s approach ultimately lead her to underemphasize the real 
challenge inherent in agonism itself: the very present risk that the (politically necessary) 
creation of the ‘other’ – and thus of some measure of inequality – leads to the idea that the 
other must be destroyed. While Mouffe certainly acknowledges this risk, her subsequent 
focus on the need for ‘common values’ distracts from its primacy.  As the next part will show, 
this is when relationships become antagonistic and is the point at which conflict no longer 
promotes the political, but destroys it.  
A continuum of risky illocutions 
What are the actual boundaries between agonistic politics and antagonistic violence? I argue 
that the answer to this question is implicit in Mouffe’s view of agonism, but requires a 
radicalization of the concept of Mouffe’s shared symbolic space to empty it of the adherence 
to any particular set of political values. Here it is worthwhile to examine what Mouffe sees as 
the function for this shared symbolic space – how exactly, in Mouffe’s understanding, a 
shared symbolic space prevents antagonism. Mouffe sees the shared ethico-political values as 
a ‘common bond’ that ensures political actors do “not treat their opponents as enemies to be 
eradicated.”  While engaged in conflict with each other, this common bond leads political 91
actors to “see themselves as belonging to the same political association”  and to recognize 92
that all conflict must take place within this shared space. What Mouffe is getting at is that the 
us/them divisions and exclusions that agonistic politics acknowledges as a legitimate part of 
politics, must not lead to the other being expelled from this shared space or, in her words, 
being ‘eradicated’. The reason for Mouffe’s insistence on this particular inclusion is not 
despite her acknowledgement that exclusion cannot be overcome  but rather because of 93
agonism’s ontological starting point that exclusion is the inevitable result of any conception 
of the ‘people’ and of any hegemonic ordering based thereon. It is this inherent exclusion that 
requires a normative appreciation for pluralism.  
These insights are, however, underemphasized in Mouffe’s thoughts on boundaries. Other 
agonistic thinkers place more importance on preserving pluralism. Bonnie Honig makes this 
clear in her thoughts on the inevitable remainder of politics.  Honig calls attention to the fact 
that no one conception of ‘the people’ can ever fully incorporate all individuals and groups. 
There will always be remainders that can never completely be included in the hegemonic 
‘we’. It is this impossibility of completeness that leads to the normative stance that agonistic 
conflict must preserve possibilities for those left out of the hegemonic order to contest their 
exclusion and demand a new constellation of ‘the people’, one that will be more inclusive of 
this excluded group (but, inevitably, will exclude some other identities).  No regime or 94
ideology should ever try to subdue or eliminate the contestation of who belongs and who 
does not, since to do so would silence those whose interests and identities inevitably cannot 
be successfully incorporated into that regime. In other words, those excluded from ‘the 
people’, must not be so finally excluded that they have no way of challenging their position. 
The distinction between the ‘we’ and the ‘they’ must always remain open to future 
contestation and any attempt to impose a fully unified and conflict-free society can only end 
in totalitarianism.  Contra to Mouffe’s interpretation of Honig’s work on this issue,  Honig 95 96
is not arguing that agonism requires a cessation of othering or the end of hegemony, but that 
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othering and hegemony must never be final. It is not that Honig thinks that exclusion of 
hegemonic closure can be avoided, but simply that this closure must not be total. It must be 
acknowledged that ‘the people’ is never fully constituted, that certain individuals and groups 
fall outside the ‘people’ and that ‘the people’ must always be open to contestation re-
constitution by shifts in the us/them distinction. In this way, Honig’s attention to the 
remainder of politics provides an important perspective when thinking about the limits of 
agonism. 
This attention to preserving the possibility of contesting political belonging allows us to 
radicalize Mouffe’s idea of a shared symbolic space. The boundary between agonism and 
antagonism is not about those who reject any particular shared values, but deals with the 
question who can participate in the contest about who belongs in the political community, in 
the shared symbolic space – whatever its contents might be. The line between agonism and 
antagonism is a division between, on the one hand, exclusion in a way that allows for 
contestation of that exclusion versus, on the other, exclusion without any possibility to 
challenge the exclusion. In other words, for the contest to remain open, the excluded 
individual or group must not be posited as never being able to enjoy the rights, liberty and 
equality of those within the political community, and the excluded individual or group must 
not be stripped of all ability to continue to struggle for those rights, liberty and equality. The 
point is not so much that all legitimate participants in the agonistic debate must frame their 
arguments in terms of liberty or equality or even that they must accept these values as the aim 
of political life, but rather that no legitimate participant can put forth demands that would 
entail stripping the other of the potentiality of enjoying whatever rights are granted to the 
political community constructed by that participant. To state Mouffe’s ideas with a slightly 
different emphasis, the othering must not lead to the other being seen as an enemy to be 
permanently excluded from the shared symbolic space, while at the same time 
acknowledging that othering always attempts to temporarily exclude the other from that 
space. This conclusion, that there must always be space open for contestation of the 
boundaries of the shared space and who belongs inside and out – by those who are considered 
the other – necessitates that defeat must only ever be political – and not defeat of the other’s 
very existence. Agonism accepts that an individual or group can be temporarily, discursively, 
placed outside of the political community but this othering must never be so complete that the 
individual or group has no way of reentering the political community. The possibility must 
remain open for the ‘people’ to be reconstituted in such a way that the other becomes one of 
the ‘us’. The realm of antagonism, on the contrary, is characterized by the discursive creation 
of an other who could never re-enter the political community, an other who has no ability to 
contest his othering. 
In practice, this means that the realm of antagonistic relations are entered as soon as an other 
is discursively constructed who must be eradicated or expelled from the space of the political 
– with no possibility to discursively challenge this expulsion. What does this mean for the 
types of exclusion that politics can legitimately create and those it cannot? We must be clear 
that such a view does not preclude politics from striving to permanently eliminate certain 
behaviors from the political community (think for example of murder, rape or pedophilia). 
The concern is, thus, not so much that such activity is othered – even if permanently. What is 
vital, though, is that in aiming to eliminate certain behaviors, the individuals who commit 
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those behaviors are not constructed as someone or something to be permanently excluded 
from the political community. Thus, whereas attempts to permanently exclude behavior can 
be accepted as part of normal politics, this can never be the case for exclusion of the people 
‘behind’ the behavior.  
There are some similarities between my emphasis on agonism as precluding a permanent 
defeat of the other and Breen’s attitude of care towards the enemy. Breen explains that the 
enemy will be seen as one to be defeated but that this defeat may only be in “respect to that 
which he represents a serious threat, not in terms of the totality of his person.”  Yet, my 97
approach differs in two important ways from that of Breen. First, I reject Breen’s assumption 
that by only focusing on the threat posed by the other, and not the totality of the person, 
antagonism can be avoided. In fact, all too often antagonism is triggered by the conviction 
(however errant) that it is the very person of the other himself who poses the threat. It is the 
(however mistaken) belief that the other cannot be separated from the threat that often ushers 
in the perceived necessity of eradicating the other, as a person. Thus, instead, I argue that the 
emphasis must simply be placed on the distinction between behavior and the person as such, 
while intentionally precluding the possibility that the other as person is ever excluded, no 
matter how serious the threat the other is perceived as posing. From this it follows that 
exclusion cannot be based on characteristics that are perceived as unchangeable. If it is a 
characteristic such as for example race, sex or sexuality that is perceived as posing the threat, 
and society perceives these characteristics as an unchangeable, inherent part of the person 
who has them, the individuals targeted could not be separated from those characteristics and 
thus would be permanently excluded.  
Moreover, it is important to note that Breen characterizes antagonism as the realm of othering 
as such, whereas I stress that othering takes place within the limits of acceptable agonistic 
behavior as well. In my view the boundary then is between agonism on the one hand and 
antagonism on the other, where agonism is the realm of passionate struggle to defeat the other 
politically and antagonism is the – unacceptable – realm of passionate struggle to defeat the 
other in their very existence.  
This boundary between agonism and antagonism does not mean that political activity that 
falls on the agonism side of the line is necessarily ‘safe’. There is no risk-free way of doing 
politics; the instability of politics is irreducible and the possibility of antagonism cannot be 
eliminated without eliminating the possibility of politics itself.  It is, however, possible to 98
identify political activity that moves toward the boundary between agonism and antagonism 
versus other types of activity that move farther away from that frontier. In this way, within 
agonistic politics – within the limits of the political – one can position behavior on a 
continuum between anti-political antagonism (relations that make politics impossible because 
they end the possibility of contestation) on the one hand and apolitical pluralism 
(relationships characterized by individual freedom, without any representation of interests as 
relating to the common good and thus also without any politics) on the other. The area 
between antagonism and complete pluralism is where politics is possible, is where the agon is 
found. As one approaches the boundary between agonism and antagonism, the risk of 
antagonism becomes greater and as one moves away from that boundary, the risk of 
antagonism lessens.  
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This is not to say that the position farthest from the antagonistic boundary – complete 
pluralism – is the most desirable position on the continuum. Adherence to an agonistic view 
of politics does not reject the idea that decisions must be made and that ground  must be 
found (temporarily) for shared political identity. Nor does it mean that closure over meaning 
should be avoided. And for these decisions and shared political identity, some form of 
othering is necessary, and thus a move toward antagonism. The necessity of keeping space 
open for contestation should not be interpreted as a prohibition on political actors aiming to 
have their claims hegemonically entrenched. The aim of agonism is not to escape hegemony; 
power and hegemony cannot be escaped and there is no “beyond hegemony.”  Neither does 99
agonism require or presuppose politio-socio-legal fields without the constraints of power on 
the people living within those fields. What matters is that those being constrained have the 
possibility to contest and actually change these constraints. The foundation of decisions and 
the basis of stable ground are not the neutral outcome of a rational deliberation process, but 
are rather the result of the exertion of power – not in the form of explicit violence, but in the 
form of hegemonic power. And since these foundations will never represent all people, 
interests and identities, they must be open to contestation and change, even while functioning 
as the (temporary) hegemony that politics results in.   
Let us now explore what this insight on the boundary between agonism and antagonism 
means in practice by turning our attention to the most proximate tool of politics – language. 
As shown above in relation to crisis discourse, it is speaking crisis that not only illustrates, 
but calls into being, the risk of permanently excluding the other. By focusing on the 
illocutionary force of crisis discourse, we can evaluate the position a particular use of crisis 
discourse inhabits on the continuum of risk. Thus, if we go back to the use of crisis discourse 
by the Socialist Party and the Freedom Party, we can attempt to place the parties on this 
spectrum. We see that the two parties engaged in different types of othering. On the one hand, 
the Socialist Party discursively constructed the ‘other’ based on changeable characteristics 
and behavior, as a group engaged in a particular activity or having a particular amount of 
wealth (bankers and the very rich). While ‘bankers’ and the ‘very rich’ are more than just 
behaviors, they are not characteristics that are perceived as an unchangeable part of their 
holders’ identities. This is reflected in the measures proposed by the Socialist Party, which 
relate to changing particular activities the rich engage in to promote their wealth (for example 
the Socialist Party’s plan to deter bonuses by taxing bonuses retroactively). These proposed 
changes do not target specific, unchangeable identities and do not have the effect of 
permanently excluding those they target from the ‘people’.  
The Freedom Party, on the other hand, defined the other with reference to the indelible 
identity of ethnicity. The Freedom Party aimed to exclude the Muslim ‘other’ permanently 
from the political body of the ‘people’, for example by banning all immigration from Muslim 
countries. Other measures proposed by the Freedom Party, although formulated neutrally and 
thus not targeting Muslims specifically, still had the effect of permanently excluding those 
they affect from the political community, for example by excluding those who have double 
nationality from representative government functions or by stripping Dutch citizens with 
double nationality of their Dutch citizenship if they commit a crime. This difference in how 
the two parties spoke crisis, puts the Socialist at a different position on the continuum of risk 
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than it does the Freedom Party. While the Socialist Party certainly engaged in othering (even 
going so far as to speak of bankers as insects) and calls for fundamental change, their 
discourse stayed more removed from constructing the other as something to be permanently 
excluded from the realm of political contestation than that used by the Freedom Party. The 
Socialist Party constructed the other based not on characteristics perceived as unchangeable 
but on behavior and it proposed changes that did not exclude this other from the political 
community. The Freedom Party’s use of crisis discourse, however, crossed the border into the 
antagonistic. First, the Freedom Party framed the ‘other’ based on the unchangeable 
characteristic of ethnicity. Next, the Freedom Party used its crisis discourse to call for 
changes that would permanently exclude this other from the Dutch community, such as the 
party’s demand to stop immigration from “Islamic countries.” This combination of 
constructing an other based on the very identity of the other instead of his behavior, along 
with calls for change that exclude the ability of the other to gain admittance to the political 
community, crossed the line from agonistic to antagonistic speech.  
4 Conclusion 
This article sheds light on agonism – and its limits – by viewing crisis discourse as an 
agonistic political practice. By viewing the speech act of crisis discourse through the lens of 
agonism, I interpret crisis discourse’s ability to create us/them divisions and call for change 
as part and parcel of the agonistic political struggle. As the discourse used by the Socialist 
Party and the Freedom Party shows, crisis discourse was employed during the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis to (re)create the ‘people’, albeit in very different ways by the two 
parties, and to call for change in economic and social structures. The Freedom Party's calls in 
particular highlighted a certain uneasiness in agonism itself. The Freedom Party's constitution 
of the people by distinguishing between a native Dutch, non-Muslim populous on the one 
hand and the EU and Muslims on the other, and the Freedom Party's claims that the 
discursively created other threatened the very identity of the people raised the question where 
agonists would place limits on speaking crisis. Certainly, agonism always presupposes a type 
of othering and sees deep change to the political community as a legitimate aim of political 
activity, yet at the same time Mouffe in particular stresses that conflict cannot be without any 
bounds. Mouffe’s insistence that antagonism must be avoided in political struggle gives us a 
place to start inquiring into these potential limits, although Mouffe herself fails to expand 
upon these limits from an agonistic perspective. I argue instead that the issue of limits can be 
adequately addressed by reference to the aim of agonism itself: to preserve struggle over 
political processes and norms. What distinguishes agonism from antagonism is thus not a lack 
of othering or exclusion but rather the way in which this other is constructed. Contra Mouffe, 
I do not see a role for values of liberty or equality here. Rather, I emphasize the importance of 
ensuring the temporary and reversible nature of exclusion. Agonism requires that the other, 
even though certainly excluded from the people in one particular political moment, retains the 
ability to contest and reconstitute the ‘people’, in the next political moment. The constant 
possibility of struggle must be preserved in order for othering to remain agonistic and to 
avoid the dangers of antagonism. 
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Based on these insights into the limits of agonism, I propose viewing political activity – and 
particularly the use of crisis discourse – as occupying particular places on a continuum of 
risky illocutions. On the one end of this continuum is antagonism and on the other complete 
pluralism. The space in between is where politics takes place; where agonism can be found. 
This continuum gives us the tools to evaluate political speech from an agonistic perspective 
and to acknowledge and manage the risk inherent in political behavior. At the same time, this 
continuum identifies a clear outer limit of acceptable political speech: once the elimination of 
the other – qua human – is called for or the boundaries of the people are created based on 
unchangeable characteristics, the agonistic morphs into the antagonistic. From this 
perspective, the Freedom Party’s use of crisis discourse to construct an other based on 
(perceived) unchangeable characteristics and to argue for the permanent removal of the other 
from the Dutch political community rapidly approached the antagonistic end of this 
continuum. On the other hand, while the Socialist Party also engaged in a harsh rhetorical 
campaign of crisis, it did so without constructing the other based on inherent characteristics 
and instead focused on changeable behaviors. In this way, the Socialist Party used a crisis 
discourse that remained more securely in the space of the political. 
This study’s view of crisis discourse as an agonistic speech practice provides a tool to 
evaluate the use of crisis discourse in current political discourse. It proposes a measure for 
critique of crisis discourse decoupled from whether the discourse justifies for deep, radical 
change to the status quo of legal of political structures, and from whether the discourse 
creates an other. Indeed – true political discourse will always create an other and it is the very 
struggle over the foundations of the political community that characterizes true political 
interaction. Moreover, in a western political landscape increasingly (once again) 
characterized by anti-establishment politics that presume and construct a threatening other, 
often based on views of the social that are not based on scientific facts, this agonistic view 
calls attention to the fact that crisis discourse is constructive, not constative; it is a speech act 
that aims to create the reality it claims already exists. Thus, instead of ‘fact-checking’ or 
accusations of irrationality, this article calls for evaluative criteria of crisis discourse based on 
whether the reality it aims to create is one in which the other is permanently excluded from 
the political community. What is important in this view, is not shared values or even a shared 
political space. Rather, what matters is that the political space of the ‘people’ – however 
contested membership therein might be – remains a place that the other can re-enter. The 
contestation itself must remain possible, and permanent exclusion from the political space is 
unacceptable.  
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